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On June 9 1983, the Conservative Government of Margaret Thatcher was re-elected with 
a simple majority of 144 seats (Zodgekar). The landslide victory that her party’s 397 seats 
("House of Commons" 2) granted her, established her government with more power and 
legitimacy for its second term, and, having returned victorious from the Falklands, she 
was ready to use that renewed power and strength to fight “the enemy within” (Thatcher 
8) at home; the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) was her target. 
Just nine months later, on 6 March 1984 the so-called miners’ strike would be 
triggered in what it is now known as one of the most important industrial struggles of 
British 20th century, famously ending with the defeat on the miners’ part and with a well-
publicised victory of the Thatcher administration (most notably by her allies in The Times, 
Telegraph, The Economist, and The Sun [Jackson 55] ). Of this struggle, many chapters 
would be engrained in history, some as striking as the Battle of Ongreave, or May Day 
1984, others as empowering as the role of the miners’ support groups and the international 
solidarity to the striking workers from all around the world. In this context, the failure of 
the strike in Nottinghamshire and the role of the Notts Area of the NUM in the defeat of 
the national union have become of especial importance for many commentators and 
historians, for it is true that in this significant blow, not only to the miners’ movement but 
to the entire labour movement, Nottingham did have a role to play. Over the different 
debates we might note various lines of argument that try to explain the position that the 
Notts Area took during the strike. Peter Gibbon proposes a division in two groups; the 
first, those arguments that consider that there was no integral difference between the Notts 
Area and other areas from the NUM, and therefore place the responsibility on external 




state factors. The lines of argument of the second group focus on more entrenched causes 
for the Area’s position and bring to the table theories of “embourgeoisement” (qtd. in 
Lawrence and Sutcliffe-Braithwaite 137) or “bourgeoisification” (Francis 30) of the 
miners or consider pit culture and the region’s labour relations (Gibbon 170). 
In this dissertation I am going to argue that the situation in the Nottinghamshire 
Area of NUM constituted, in fact, a combination of several factors, both external and 
internal to the coalfield, and not just one of them as many commentators sustained in their 
analyses. First, Nottinghamshire’s tradition of reactionary unionism, represented and 
deeply marked by the practices of George Spencer, tightly tied with the “butty” system, 
the distinctive system of production of the coalfield, that historically promoted 
individualism among the miners, as will be later explained. Second, the deeply federated 
structure of the NUM, which allowed the right-wing opposition in the Notts Area to defy 
the NUM’s National Executive Committee (NEC) and refuse to join the rest of coalfields 
on strike. Third, the existence of a neo-liberal offensive carried out by Margaret Thatcher 
and her Policy Unit (PU) alongside other political allies and some great businesses and 
fortunes of the country, against the miners, seeking to dismantle the labour movement, 
the structures of worker defiance and the “militant” left wing of the country. 
To explore these factors, I am going to set them in the backdrop of the establishment 
and evolution of the different fronts of the conflict in the Nottinghamshire Area and, 
whenever necessary, nationally, first exploring their background, and then exploring the 
different phases of the strike in Nottinghamshire, culminating with the secession from the 





A background to the conflict: the NUM and the Ripley Report, an urge 
for revenge. 
 
The successful national strikes of 1972 and 1974 laid the ground for the conflict of the 
1984-5 strike inasmuch as they announced the sides in the future conflict. Firstly, they 
were a defeat of the Conservative government of Heath, who had to call for general 
elections after the 1974 strike and subsequently lost the government to a minority Labour 
executive. Secondly, it showed the strength of the labour movement in the country, 
embodied in the miners’ struggle and the vast web of solidarity that they obtained from 
different industries (rail workers for example). 
These two consecutive victories on the miners’ part also signified the power and 
influence of different left-wing organizations, in particular those networks that functioned 
around the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) (Darlington 77). From the start of 
the 70s, the situation in the NUM had changed, and the organization, previously 
controlled by right-wing officials (both in the NEC and in the Annual Conference), started 
to turn leftwards. Following some unofficial strike actions at the turn of the decade (1696 
and  1970) (Wray and Allsop 152), the left gained a majority in the Annual Conference, 
making it more difficult for Joe Gormley’s NEC, still controlled by a moderate right-wing 
majority, to smoothly control the entirety of the union’s actions (Darlington 76; Wray and 
Allsop 152). As Ralph Darlington argues, the strength of the rank-and-file sector of the 
NUM, mostly mobilised by left-wing militants in their coalfield, was essential for the 
success of both strikes, as they managed to reach a profound organization that allowed 
them to defy the official guidelines sent by the NEC or the Area officials (mostly loyal to 




method of mass picketing to spread the strike to other parts of the country and other guilds 
(71-77).  
In 1981, seven years after the miners’ ultimate victory against the Heath 
government, Arthur Scargill, a big name in the strikes that brought it down, was appointed 
as leader of the union, and in 1984 the left achieved, for the first time in the union’s 
history, a majority in the NEC, culminating the already announced rise of the left within 
the NUM’s institutions. (Howell 150; Darlington 85) 
The 1974 strike meant, on the other hand, a major defeat for the Conservative 
government, which had already shown its weakness against the organised miners back in 
1972. Defeated and, some would say, humiliated, Edward Heath had no choice but to call 
a general election, in a desperate attempt to gain legitimacy and “retake” some of the 
political strength that he had lost through the industrial conflict. Instead of that, the 
Labour government managed to form a minority government.  
After this blow to the Conservative Party, a group within it took advantage of the 
lack of real leadership and the low morale that the party was suffering, to gain more and 
more influence in their open critique of the Heath executive. The monetarist faction 
considered that the weakness, and subsequent defeat of the Heath Conservative 
government laid in its adherence to the Keynesian post-war system and the obstruction 
that its state economic intervention, and its nationalization of industries (the coal industry 
being among them) meant to the full expansion of the country’s economy (Jackson 50-
51; Rawsthorne 158). They advocated the expansion of a real free-market, without any 
intervention from the state, and in order to do so they had to break apart the welfare state 
and its monopolies, like the National Health Service (NHS), the Central Electricity 
Generating Board (CEGB) and the National Coal Board (NCB) (Jackson 52; Rawsthorne 




reached the Leadership of the Conservative Party, the neo-liberal faction took control of 
the party for the first time, and criticising all that did not fully commit to monetarism 
(who were often referred to as “wets”), they started their crusade for a fully privatization 
of the national industries (Rawsthorne 159-160). 
From the very beginning, they marked the working-class institutions, mostly the 
unions, as an obstacle to their plans, an “enemy within” (Thatcher) who had been given 
to much liberty and strength on the past few decades. In both their public speeches 
(Lawrence and Sutcliffe-Braithwaite 134) and in their private political activities  they 
expressed their hatred towards unions and socialism, at the same time that they remarked 
on the importance of defeating these political rivals in order to save “the quiet majority” 
they represented (Lawrence and Sutcliffe-Braithwaite 140). But if they were to defeat 
them, they would have to be prepared. In 1977 Nicholas Ridley, a loyal enthusiast of the 
monetarist cause, was asked to draw a plan for the privatization, and so the so-called 
Ridley Report was born. The Report was far from being “a vague proposal to be taken or 
left. Rather, it was a detailed stratagem that gave precise recommendations on how to 
prepare for and win the battle, once provoked” (Rawsthorne 161). In it, Ridley proposed 
several steps that had to be taken in preparation to the imminent conflict if they wanted 
to have the leading hand throughout the strike; first, he recommended to recruit 
ideologically-aligned allies in the energy sector that had interests in the bringing down of 
the coal industry (Ridley 26). As such, Thatcher invited senior officials of British 
Petroleum (BP), Shell and British Energy to sit in her Policy Unit. Second, he advised to 
“operated with the maximum quantity of stocks (…) at power stations”(Ridley 27), 
advising to import foreign coal in order to do so. Third, he suggested the employment of 
non-union haulage companies to supply the power stations and transport other goods 




effectively turned the security bodies into a coordinated paramilitary force (Gibbon 171) 
to deal with the strike and the containment of the pickets (Ridley 27). And finally, he urged 
to the passing of anti-strike policies that would weaken the position of the striking miners 
(Ridley 28). 
By 1984, after a first term of preparing the terrain for a successful confrontation 
against Scargill’s NUM, following the steps and recommendations drawn by Ridley in 
his report, Thatcher and her Policy Unit (PU), completely constituted by ideological allies 
for the neo-liberal cause, were prepared for the battle. 
 
Spencerism and pit culture: reactionism in Nottinghamshire. 
 
When commenting on the overt opposition to any strike action that grew in the 
Nottinghamshire coalfield during the miners’ strike of 1984-5, David Amos calls upon 
two main causes; the harassment and the negation of their constitutional rights  as 
members of the NUM by the union’s leadership (embodied by Scargill in the NEC), their 
own branch officials and the left militant picketers. On the other hand, Callinicos and 
Simons argue, in their book, that the evolution of the opposition in the Notts Area revealed 
the weakness of the NUM’s leadership to guide the miners into the strike, and the great 
power and  efficiency of the paramilitary police, instrumental in Thatcher’s plan to bring 
down the strike. Although from different perspectives and for different purposes, both of 
them argue that there was no basic difference between Nottinghamshire and other 
coalfields at the start of the strike, and that the position of the Area was a turnout of 
external forces; whether it is external provocations or a neoliberal complot. Therefore, 
the aforementioned authors omit the importance of the coalfield’s historical labour 




miners’ strike cannot be fully understood without looking into the vast tradition of 
Spencerism that existed in the region, and the so-called “butty” system that made it 
possible. 
George Spencer was a Labour politician (MP for Broxtowe) and unionist from 
Nottinghamshire, member of the Nottinghamshire Miner Association (NMA), of which 
he was the general secretary in 1926, until he was expelled from the Miners’ Federation 
of Great Britain (MFGB, the predecessor of the NUM as a national union) after he led his 
District back to work during the general strike of 1926. Following his expulsion, he 
created the Nottinghamshire Miner’s Industrial Union, or as it would be known the 
‘Spencer Union’ (Krieger 179). The Industrial Union was effectively a company union 
(or yellow union); an instrument of the employers to take control over their workers’ (in 
this case mineworkers) organization and industrial activities. And as such it was enforced 
on the Notts mineforce. Krieger collects the memories of several miners from the time 
the Spencer Union was active: “(the) management stipulated that if you were not in the 
Spencer Union, you did not have a job” (qtd. in Krieger 183). As it could be expected, the 
tandem between the employers and the yellow union quickly showed results; as time 
passed the membership of the Industrial Union rocketed, while that of the NMA 
plummeted:  
It was the alarming fall in membership of their own Nottinghamshire Miners’ 
Association. In 1925 it had 32,500 members. The membership in 1928, 
following the 1926 stoppage (after the creation of the Spencer Union), was 
15,740; in 1930, 13,475; in 1931, 13,315; in 1932, 12.295; in 1933, 9,985 ; in 
January 1935, 8,500; at which date 43,600 were employed in this area 





Soon enough, the NMA was crushed and the Industrial Union, with its new 
hegemony, was the only option for “organization” in the Nottinghamshire coalfield. The 
yellow union dig its roots deep inside the region’s historical labour relations, the ‘butty’ 
system, and was enforced through its methods as well. 
The “butty” system was a method of subcontracting, in which the mine-owner hired 
a subcontractor for the extraction of the coal, who would hire, at the same time, other 
miners that worked for them. The “butty” directed the action of his 30-50 men team inside 
the mine, was greatly responsible for the productivity, and also had control over the wages 
and discipline of the miners who worked for him (Church and Outram 27; Gibbon 175). 
Ultimately, they controlled who worked and who did not, creating a constant sense of 
uncertainty for every collier. These managers would search for people that did not have 
any ties with the NMA, they would discharge those that did or those that showed any 
signs of criticism towards the employers. When in 1936, some industrial dispute hit 
Harworth Colliery, the ‘butties’ exerted their power:  
The manager (…) now wanted to punish those whom (…) had been the 
ringleaders in the stoppage. For this he drew up certain conditions which they 
must sign before he would reinstate them. They refused to do this and, 
therefore, they were not re-employed. (Page 206) 
 
It also seemed that, after the miners had subdued to the Industrial Union, favoured 
by the employers and the “butties”, the were alienated from its running, and would be 
excluded from their meetings: “It was the Spencer Union… and even then you couldn’t 
attend meetings. You didn’t know when they were held. There were lots of committee 





The “butty” system promoted a high degree of individualism inside the colliery (and 
even within the teams), alongside with competitivity in their incentive-oriented structure, 
values that, as both Gibbon and Krieger argued, were engrained in the region’s tradition, 
and favoured the sustainment of “Spencerism”’s hegemony in Nottinghamshire’s pit 
politics.  
The Spencer Union lasted as such until 1937 when “under the threat of a national 
strike, it was reabsorbed into the Nottinghamshire District of the MFGB” (Wray and 
Allsop 149) Spencer himself becoming the President of the new organization in MFGB, 
with the District official posts completely taken by his former allies (Gibbon 174). Even 
with the Industrial Union out of first sight, Spencer made great advances in diminishing 
the MFGB’s influence, and deeper planted the roots of yellow unionism in the 
Nottinghamshire coalfield. The federal system of the union did, in fact, benefit this 
ideological entrenchment of “Spencerism” in the coalfield, as districts remained vastly 
autonomous, and the power of the central Executive was indeed quite limited in their 
influence over the different districts. The union’s organization made it difficult for any 
sentiment of national solidarity to arise, and even less in the company-influence 
Nottinghamshire, where any step towards centralization or joint action by the MFGB 
Executive (or any proposal of such a thing by any other District) met instant critique and 
opposition (Wray and Allsop 149). In 1944, after a decade long movement for the 
reformation of the federal structure of the MFGB, the NUM was created to replace the 
previous union in an attempt to create a truly national union, were solidarity could emerge 
between the previous districts, in order to face industrial conflicts with real unity and 
organization (Baldwin). Yet, as Allsop and Wray argue, contrary to the initial aims to 
replace the sectionalism that existed in the MFGB, the new union loosely adapted the 




In Nottinghamshire, an Area that pressed for maintaining as much of their 
independence as possible during the negotiations for the NUM’s “constitution”, the 
“butty” system and “Spencerism” were adapted into the new organization, as can be seen 
in the 1953 introduction of the first District Power Loading Agreement (DPLA) in 
Nottinghamshire, in which the aforementioned labour system was adapted and further 
institutionalised (Krieger), maintaining a high incentive-lead production, and the loose 
figure of the ‘butty’. Therefore, individualism, competitivity and a localised identity still 
had major significance in the coalfield’s pit culture, and, in its pit politics. 
The introduction, in 1966, of the National Power Loading Agreement (NPLA) 
meant the implementation, for the first time in the country, of a national wage system, 
that sought to eliminate the differences between the Areas. Under this new agreement the 
different Areas could no longer bargain their wages directly with the employers; that 
competence was now of the national union. This measure met with instant opposition in 
Nottinghamshire, where the ability of drawing their own labour agreements (as they did 
with the DPLAs) was essential to maintain their productivist approach to labour. This 
meant that under the NPLA the still powerful ‘Spencerism’ of the Area could not maintain 
the “butty” system that sustained it, and therefore, saw itself weakened. This led to the 
advance of a new feeling of national solidarity in the coalfield, that itself laid the ground 
for the rise of the militant left in the Area, mirroring the 1970s national trend. If it is true 
that such rise was relatively moderate in comparison with other coalfields such as 
Yorkshire (Amos 45), it becomes apparent in the election of Joe Whelan, member of the 
Communist Party,  as General Secretary of the Notts NUM Area in 1977 (46) that 
‘Spencerism’ suffered a blow.  
All the national unity and solidarity built up from the implementation of the NPLA, 




reintroduced via the AIS (Area Incentive Schemes) in 1977 (Wray and Allsop 155-157). 
Then, the ‘embittered’ right in Nottinghamshire remembered the 15% cut that the 
implementation of the national agreement meant for their wages (Wray and Allsop 151; 
Krieger 176), and the attack that it constituted to their ‘rights’, and when the NUM called 
for strike action in 1984, they were certain of their opposition. 
 
 
Pickets and ballots: the game begins. 
 
The announcement, in February 1981, of major pit closures all over the British coalified 
by the National Coal Board (NCB) anticipated the main causes of the 1984-5 conflict 
three years before its outbreak. Directly after such announcement, different unofficial 
strike actions spread throughout the different, mostly left-wing Areas affected by the 
closures, showing the strength and degree of solidarity that still existed within the NUM. 
Fearing that the miners’ actions would escalate into a bigger conflict, the NCB quickly 
withdrew the plan on redundancies in what many saw a humiliating moment for the 
Conservative government of Thatcher (Allsop and Wray 155; Arnold 104; Francis 28; 
Gibbon 165). Scargill’s NUM showed once more the influence that the left kept in the 
miners’ movement. 
In Nottinghamshire, the untimely death of Joe Whelan brought Henry Richardson, 
a supporter of Scargill, to the position of the Area’s General Secretary in 1982, 
perpetuating the left’s representation within the Area officials. As Amos states, the early 
80s sought a moderate advance of the left, exemplified in the Area Executive elections of 
1983-1984, with 9 out of the 10 elected members supporting the strike at the beginning 




Richardson, member of the NEC, would complete the block in support of the strike 
despite him being “a typical representation of the Area’s (moderate) culture” (Howell 
155). The other two officials of the Area, the conservatives Roy Lynk and David 
Predergast (Area Financial Secretary and Area Agent, respectively), believing that the 
Nottinghamshire coalfield was “under little threat (of) closures”, rallied in opposition to 
any action when the threat of closure and redundancies returned in 1983, showing the 
lack of solidarity and the productivism engrained in the Area’s pit politics, directly 
inherited from Spencerism. As Howell said: 
the unity often seemed that of the Area rather than any wider solidarity and 
was expressed in pit culture of cooperation with management (and 
employers) in pursuit of a high productivity and high earning, un hindered 
by what many Nottinghamshire men dismissed as the restrictive and 
archaic customs of other, less productive Areas.  (154)  
The Spencerist right-wing rallied behind the idea of ‘non-political’ opposition in 
contrast with the ‘Scargillist’ left-wing militants, who were the enemies of the common 
people, the enemies of progress, and most importantly, the enemies of democracy (Arnold 
104). They combined the discourse of the Spencer Union, also promoted as a ‘non-
political’ union, with Thatcherite mainstream discourse, manufactured since Thatcher’s 
holding of the opposition leadership during the mid-70s, and displayed in the media to 
ideologically attack those that supposed any opposition to the advance of neoliberalism; 
socialist, trade unions and Scargill personally (Lawrence and Sutcliffe-Braithwaite 137-
143). 
When in September 1983, the infamous American strike-breaker, Ian MacGregor, 
was appointed as the head of NCB, Scargill claimed that Thatcher and her government 




Knowing the existence and contents of the Ridley Report, we know that he was in the 
right. Indeed, Ridley recommended caution in the displaying of his plan, and, looking in 
retrospective, we see that the only thing that prevented the conflict from starting in 1981, 
in the light of the plan of pit closures, was that his recommendations were not met, and 
the risk, therefore, was too high. The appointment of MacGregor was, in fact, also on 
recommendation of Ridley, as he was a known anti-trade-unionist who had shown his 
worth back in his native America, and therefore, was a worthy ally (Amos 51; Rawsthorne 
172-173; Ridley 22), ideologically aligned with the neo-liberal offence.  
When on 6 March 1984, MacGregor announced the closure of 20 pits across the 
country, the miners, that saw twenty thousand of them being dismissed from their jobs, 
and already weary of the plans that Thatcher’s executive had for ‘Mac the Knife’ (as 
MacGregor was called), started to rally for a strike in response to such an attack. No more 
than three days later, the first Areas to go on strike, Yorkshire and Scotland, we out in the 
streets. Now, several decades after the start of the strike, we know that the extend of 
MacGregor’s NCB plans far exceeded the closure of 20 pits, but that he intended that 
“over the three years 1983-1985 […] 75 pits would be closed […] reduc(ing) the 
workforce by 55,000” (Higham). 
On 9 March, the strike had started in Yorkshire and Scotland, both Areas deeply 
castigated by the ruling of the NCB, and both with a left majority that manage to lead the 
whole coalfield to the strike. The NEC decided that, should any other Area of the union 
engage in industrial action, as a response to the NCB’s decision, it would be declared 
official action by the NUM’s Rule 41 (Allsop and Wray 155; Amos 63). Probably 
believing that the solidarity endorsed in previous strikes was intact, the Scargill’s NEC 
decided to let the expansion of the strike be gradual, letting the Areas take their own 




Yorkshireman and/or Scot decided to move on to strike action. This decision was a 
mistake in the long run, a mistake that would be used by the Notts right-wing to gain 
power and diminish the influence of the NEC and the left.  
In Nottingham, the officials reacted hastily to the development of the strike in the 
north and the response given by the NEC: 
[an] area ballot would take place over a twenty-four-hour period from 6pm 
on Thursday 15 March to 6 pm on Friday 16 March 1984. The count was 
planned for Saturday 17 March 1984 at the Nottinghamshire NUM 
Headquarters […] the result being announce […] on Sunday 18 March 
1984. (Amos 63-64) 
With the action starting with heated passion in their northern county neighbour, 
Yorkshire, the Notts Area decided to advise other Areas to avoid any picketing before a 
resolution was reached in the ballot. Many in the British coalfield could remember the 
times that Nottinghamshire had wavered in the past, and they were sceptical of the 
possible decision of those who many considered as “endemic scabs” (Howell 154). In an 
attempt to extent the influence of the starting strike to the Notts Area and trying to 
persuade the miners to vote to join industrial action, the Yorkshire Area overlooked the 
advice and flying pickets entered into the Area from the north on the morning of 12 
March. The role they had in the widening of the division between the Notts Area and the 
NEC has been the source of abundant debate between commentators from different 
ideological tendencies, as they would be essential for the future development of the 
‘working miners’ movement, and the strengthening of Notts right. First, we have to 




We must be prepared to deal with the problem of violent picketing. This 
again is a matter going beyond policy for nationalised industries. But it is 
also vital to our policy that on a future occasion we defeat violence in 
breach of the law on picketing. The only way to do this is to have a large, 
mobile squad of police who are equipped and prepared to uphold the law 
against the likes of the […] mob. (Ridley 25) 
Ridley and the PU were aware of how essential pickets were in expanding and 
maintaining the strike active. As Darlington argues, pickets played an essential role in the 
miners’ victories of 1972 and 1974, as they not only spread industrial action from one 
Area to another, but it also spread the strike to other guilds, provoking a much feared 
national standstill (80-84); if they wanted the strike to fail categorically, the containment 
and undermining of pickets would be of essential importance. The police force was 
transformed from a fairly decentralised entity to a paramilitary force built on techniques 
of repression brought from the occupied Northern Ireland and from the colonies 
(Rawsthorne 166, 173). When the strike started, the police was quick to enclose the whole 
county to stop any outside influence from getting into the working Area: 
The effect of these reforms was to create a highly mobile and versatile 
policing unit that could be deployed to any required area or situation, 
quickly. […] just eight days into the miners’ strike, 3000 police, drawn 
from 17 forces across the country, were already stationed in the 
Nottinghamshire area of the NUM. (Buckley 425) 
 After the result of the Notts ballot resulted in a negative to engage in industrial 
action, a new wave of pickets that came from the north could barely get close to the 




and more violent, “the mining communities and villages were under police siege”(Hopper 
19). The representation of this pickets in all sorts of media became distorted, and the 
versions changing from commentator to commentator. 
In most media, picketers were portrayed as violent extremists trying to harass the 
common sensical working miners. Aligning themselves with neoliberal discourse, they 
were antidemocratic enemies of the state and a risk to any kind of progress (Arnold 103-
104, 107). “What is a stake is the future of our democracy” said the Sunday Times in 
October 1984 (qtd. in Rawsthorne 180). Even the BBC, supposedly not fully aligned with 
neoliberalism at the time, “inadvertently” distorted the images of a clash between the 
picket line and the police to make seem that the latter was attacked by the striking mob 
(Hopper 19). Some moderate commentators, like Amos, argued that the picketers were 
violent against the working miners, who were targeted and physically and verbally 
harassed, and that the picketing action, backed by the NUM, was an attack on their rights 
and their democracy (64-68). In both cases, voice was given to those miners that opposed 
the strike from the beginning, and they were portrayed as victims of a tyrannical rule, 
mistreated by Scargill’s NEC and protected by the police.  
Other commentators closer to the left also vary in their interpretation of the pickets. 
Some overstate the calculated police operation and castigate NUM’s leadership while 
arguing that, was it not for the weakness of the union and the strength demonstrated by 
Thatcher , there would have been nothing holding Notts miners from joining the strike 
(Callinicos and Simons). Others attribute the failure of the pickets to their incoordination 
and overtly intimidatory nature towards working miners that created a sense of rejection 
to the strike in them (Darlington 80-82). 
In reality, “pickets were normally boxed by the police out of earshot and sometimes 




police, not other miners”(Gibbon 173). This did not stop the strike opposition in the Area 
to use pickets for the developing of their own discourse, portraying working miners as 
victims of violence whose democratic rights were being denied by those favoured by the 
‘authoritarian’ NEC. They called for a national ballot to be held, declaring that, until a 
national election declared the national strike, they would not join the strike. The political 
division inside the Notts Area escalated quickly, with the left and the strike supporters of 
the Area Executive ruling in favour of the extension of the strike, considering it official 
and criticising the working miners as ‘scabs’, and the miners increasingly flocking back 
to work as the months passed. Both sides would clash in the May Day celebrations of 
1984 in Mansfield, what was considered a major victory of the right-wing opposition, and 
by June of the same year, all the strike supporters in the Area Executive were removed 
on bloc, alongside the few in the Area Council, constituting Nottinghamshire as a definite 
working Area, and leaving Richardson and Chadburn, and therefore the NUM’s NEC, 
with little to no influence in the Area (Amos 89, 100; Howell 156). 
Spencerism returned with renewed strength to the pit politics, although it never fully 
went away. With its material labour relations being restored in 1977, a clearly Spencerist 
discourse grew back in the Notts right-wing, as it became apparent in many of their 
speeches during the strike and their campaign for a national ballot, mentioning their duty 
towards keeping production up, their rights as an (pseudo)independent Area, and their 
clear loathing of the militant left, that they saw embodied in Scargill and his supporters. 
As engrained as the ghost of the Industrial Union was in the Notts Area, Spencerism made 
a quick and certain comeback. The discourse used by the opposition, and replicated in 
national media, resonated with the pit culture many of the miners professed, and, growing 
in influence and successfully undermining the left of the Area, it was just a matter of 






The  right, the Working Miners’ Committee and the courts  
 
 
On 26 April, the Notts Area Executive, still controlled by the pro-strike left, 
democratically extended the strike to the Area with a ballot result of “11 to 2 to make the 
strike official in Nottinghamshire” (Allsop and Wray 156). The right, however, decided 
to oversee this result, calling it undemocratic and adhering themselves to the March 
ballot; the only democratic result they would accept. They rallied behind their ‘right to 
work’ campaign, and in May Day 1984, both factions clashed in Mansfield, where it was 
left clear that the right held enough power to defy the pro-strikers. On 10 May they would 
create the Nottinghamshire Working Miners’ Committee “to pursue legal action to prove 
that the strike in Nottinghamshire was unofficial”(Amos 94), thus starting the legal 
struggle that defined the relationship between the Notts working miners and the NUM in 
the 10 months up until the end of the strike. Colin Clarke, from the traditional right of the 
Area, took an especially relevant role, as he led the move to courts and managed to obtain 
the £10,000 the legal expenses ascended to in less than a month (Amos 94,99; Howell 
157). On 25 May the courts declared the extension of the strike illegal, and by June, the 
right behind the NWMC had gained control of the Area’s bodies. Victorious and strong 
the Notts Area and the NWMC decided to arm themselves with an able body of lawyers 
and legal advisors and continue their offensive in the courts. 
The courts had already had an important role during the strike by then. With the 
heavy picket action that took place in the first months of the strike, thousands of picketers 




became overwhelming. Buckley argues that the representation of miners in daily media 
had a huge impact on the courts ruling, even in the first stages of the strike: 
In law, one was entitled to assume, in light of what had happened in similar 
cases, that an event was probable. As nightly reports of miner-led violence 
and mass picketing exploded onto the news, there was little to differentiate 
between miners’ mass pickets on a Tuesday, Wednesday or Friday; the 
expected patterns of behaviour became the same. (Buckley 429) 
The bombardment of information about miners’ violence conditioned the opinion 
that the magistrates had of the strikers even before they reached the courtroom. The film 
time dedicated to miners’ violence and pickets was, in fact, ten times superior to the time 
dedicated to show police violence against the same pickets (429). Adding this to the 
demonizing discourse towards Scargill, the NUM, and the militant miners, the role that 
the media played as an ideological weapon is. Buckley also shows that the magistrates 
were a group prone to accept the conservative discourse that was transmitted in media:  
Of the 64 judges involved in the dispute, 66 per cent went to public school, 
and 82 per cent went on to Oxbridge. Their average age was 63.8 years, 
and 61 per cent had been appointed since Thatcher was elected in 1979. 
(qtd. in Buckley 429) 
The overall bias derived from the ideological bombardment and the high volume of 
arrests did nothing but grow as time passed. After the infamous Battle of Orgreave on 18 
June, when the arrests peaked, Thatcher’s PU intervened the overwhelmed courts, calling 
on them to deliver harsher sentences and made magistrates with connections with the left 




inclined to rule against the miners and their organizations, the Notts Area and the NWMC 
launched their legal offensive against the NUM. 
On 15 May, before the strike in Nottinghamshire was declared null by the courts, 
the leaders of the NWMC started to establish relations with other anti-strike  officials of 
the British coalfield, from Lancaster, South Derby and Leicester, working towards a 
national project that would unite them in their crusade against the NUM (Amos 99; 
Howell 157). This cooperation would culminate in the creation of the National Working 
Miners’ Committee (NaWMC) in August, of which, a man called David Hart would be 
essential. David Hart was a millionaire, the heir of a banker, educated in Eton and an 
advocate neoliberal and Thatcherite (Aitken 500; Amos 100; Rawsthorne 187), and as 
such, wanted to see the ‘Marxist NUM’ torn apart. He offered his full support to Thatcher 
and the PU. Having been an integral part of the back-to-work campaign in Derbyshire, he 
decided to tour around the Midlands searching for working miners that they could use to 
take the NUM to the courts (Rawsthorne 187). Dressed as a miner, he made his presence 
noticeable in some working-miners hotspots: 
Hart established his presence in one or two Nottinghamshire pubs, where 
an increasing band of anit-Scargill rebels congregated after working their 
shifts in the East Midlands pits. Hart’s technique was to play dominoes with 
them, to lose, to pay for their losses in pints of beer and […] to take snuff 
(Aitken 450) 
There, disguised as a fellow miner, he allegedly got in touch with the officials of 
the NWMC, whom he helped to organise and fund the NaWMC, alongside other big 
businesses like  Saatchi & Saatchi, Taylor Woodrow and United Biscuits, among others 




influencial in the Notts Area, were left on the leadership of the Committee, yet, the 
funding that Conservative organizations and businesses provided was essential to reach 
their objective: incapacitate the NUM by taking it to court in behalf of individual working 
miners. 
After the June elections, the Notts Area decided to distance themselves from the 
NWMC, and the already in-the-making NaWMC, and continue their legal struggle 
against the NUM as an Area; after all, they (the working miners) had taken over the 
executive bodies of the Area and there was no point to continue with a separate 
committee. Although it is true that some officials like Chris Butcher, Colin Bottomore 
and Bob Copping  decided to leave the NaWMC to focus on the Area, there was not real 
separation between both organizations until December 1984, and even then, some 
relevant names from the NaWMC, like Clarke and Liptrott, would still hold a great deal 
of influence inside the Area (Amos 100, 101, 114; Howell 159). Their power and 
legitimacy in the Area strengthened after the elections, and having provided themselves 
with a body of legal advisors of their own (Amos 111), the anti-strike Notts Area did not 
receive well the news of the implementation of new disciplinary measures to the NUM’s 
rulebook. In the Extraordinary Annual Conference (EAC) called on 11 and 12 July the 
addition of the disciplinary Rule 51, which issued the possibility of retribution against 
those that acted against the NUM’s national line, to the union’s constitution was passed 
with Nottinghamshire voting against it (108-110). Fearing that the new rule was going to 
be used against them, the opposition they demonstrated was total, and its passing ensued 
legal action. The Area took the NUM to the High Court, which eventually would rule that 
the change in the rule book was null, alleging that there had been an error in the 
democratic procedure; the striking miners sit-in in the Area’s Head Quarters previous to 




(Amos 111; Howell 159). Had the preparations gone as planned, the voting of the Area 
in the Conference would have not been affected, as their delegates voted against the 
change of the NUM’s constitution either way. When in August the union called a Special 
Delegates Conference to ‘properly’ introduce Rule 51, Nottinghamshire refused to 
participate in it, and in October, they outright refused to accept it. Clarke was essential in 
taking the NUM to the High Court, as he rallied with other 16 branch officials to bring 
the rule down, and this was not going to be the last time that the president of the NWMC 
would be instrumental in Notts’ legal war against NUM (Howell 159). 
Advised by their legal counsel, the Area engaged into a process of changing the 
Area rules to “protect the Nottingham Area from the new disciplinary rule”(Amos 112). 
Clarke’s branch, Pye Hill, proposed to delete Rule 30 from the Area’s rulebook (Howell 
159), a rule that stated that “In all matters in which the rules of this union and those of the 
national union are in conflict, the rules of the national union shall apply” 
(Nottinghamshire Area NUM). The proposition of such deletion meant a de-facto 
constitutional breaking apart from the national union, which threatened the Area with 
legal actions if they continued with their ‘rebellion’. In the Area Council Meeting (ACM) 
of December 1984, however, the Notts Area finally deleted Rule 30, and the NUM lost 
complete effective control on one of his most productive Areas. 
Nationally, the NUM was already breaking apart in December, defeated by the legal 
body of the NaWMC, funded by the country’s big businesses. In August, the funds of the 
South Wales Area of the NUM were confiscated by the High Court, and in October it 
ruled the fund seizing of the entire NUM. The NaWMC was in the frontline of the 





By far the greatest deterrent of any strike, whether in the public or the 
private sector, is clearly to cut off the supply of money to the strikers, and 
make the Union finance them. (…) It is clearly vital in order to defeat the 
attack which assuredly will come (…) that our policy on funds for strikers 
be put in effect quickly and that it be sufficiently tough to act as a major 
deterrent. (Ridley 25) 
David Hart had been sending reports of his clandestine actions in the Working 
Miners’ Committee to Thatcher and the PU since the creation of such an organization. 
His advances were what encouraged the PU to issue and directly support the case for the 
seizing of the union’s funds. In November the NUM’s central fund were taken, but not 
the ones that had been taken outside the country, nor those that came from foreign miners’ 
communities. In February 1985, all the union’s funds finally fell, announcing the end of 
the strike a month later (Rawsthorne 187-190) 
With the support of their allies in the NaWMC, the Notts Area had finally gained 
the independence they so desired. The courts, aligned with the neoliberal offense against 
miners, played an important role in the financial and legal war of the second part of the 
strike; helping the Notts Area to break through NUM’s superiority, and the NaWMC to 
put the union on check in the courts, saturating it with dozens of trials and cases, and 
accumulating fines and other sentences on its crippled back. 
 
 
The end of strike: Secession and the UDM. Conclusion. 
 
The NUM was defeated nationally; the strike came to an end at the beginning of March 




union on 6 July 1985, which would later constitute a grossing part of the Union of 
Democratic Workers (UDM) alongside other organizations of working miners’ (Amos 
117). “From that time onwards miners’ in the Nottinghamshire coalfield would be 
represented by two trade unions” expresses Amos, “as was the case from 1926 to 1937” 
(117). Yet, as was the case in that decade, such a claim is, at least, imprecise. As the 
Spencer Union did back in the day, the UDM claimed the exclusivity to negotiate with 
the employers (first the NCB, and later the privatised British Coal Corporation), leaving 
the NUM with no power in the area (Howell 161).  
Thatcher’s neoliberal enterprise had been successful, and the fall of the NUM was 
greatly celebrated by the monetarists of her Policy Unit. They had successfully defeated 
the enemy within and, as Ridley stated in his Report, they were successful in making the 
defeat “irreversible“(Ridley 17); the entire labour movement had suffered “a shattering 
blow from which it had yet to recover” (Rawsthorne 193).  
The Nottinghamshire Area of the NUM played, in this enterprise, a relevant role, 
as there converged different internal and external factors that favoured the establishment 
of a powerful opposition to the union. Internally, the labour relations of the butty-system, 
and the ideological mark left by Spencer’s Industrial Union, made the Area prone to 
oppose industrial action and align itself with Thatcher’s plans. Externally, the neoliberal 
offense created the appropriate context in the Area for the thriving of the anti-strike right 
wing; the police, the biased courts, the ideologically charged media, all provided the 
opposition with the security and tools necessary to succeed in their struggle against the 
left wing NEC. Taking into account the combination of these internal and external factors, 
we can but conclude, that the role of opposition that Nottinghamshire played in the defeat 
of the NUM was not one-sided, as many commentators maintain, but a combination of 




With no opposition left, the government’s plans for privatization started to take 
shape; coal, iron and steel, gas, electricity, water supply, trucking, airlines, 
telecommunications and public housing, all were privatised (Rawsthorne 194; Watkins). 
One by one, the supposedly secure mines of Nottinghamshire ceased production with no 
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